Responsa for Bava Batra 99:2

Q. A drew up a legal document in which he used the following words: "Effective as of today, but to be executed after our (meaning himself and his wife, L) deaths, our daughter R shall inherit an equal share with her brothers, those already born and those that might be born, in whatever will remain of my estate." After A's death, his children and his widow, L, interpreted the document to mean that A had appointed L trustee over his estate. When L proved a very inefficient, careless, and wasteful trustee, A's sons reached an agreement with L, whereby she was to receive forty marks for turning over the estate to A's sons immediately. Before relinquishing her trusteeship, L and her youngest son B (who was eighteen years of age) agreed to allow R's husband to take his wife's share of the estate immediately, without having to wait for L's death. A's two other sons object to this latter agreement.
A. A's heirs were entitled to take over his estate at any time they wished to do so. The giving of forty marks to L in order that she relinquish her trusteeship, was entirely unnecessary, for A's document, while making the collection of R's share in A's estate dependant on L's death, did not appoint L trustee of said estate. Moreover, had A explicitly appointed L trustee of his estate, the court would have removed her at no expense to the heirs, since she had proven to be inefficient, careless, and wasteful. The second agreement is not binding on A's two sons since L, not being a trustee of the estate, had no legal power to dispose of part of the estate. B, however, was able to forego his own part of R's share, and his act is binding upon such part if R (or her husband) was in possession of her share at the time of the latter agreement. Thus R would be entitled to receive one third of her share (B's part of her share) immediately, while B's two brothers would manage the other two-thirds for their own profit and gain until L's death.
Although the brothers are entitled to manage R's share for their own profit, they are not permitted to sell or otherwise alienate any part of it; and their responsibility thereto would be that of a gratuitous watchman. Thus any increase that will accrue until L's death will belong to the brothers, while, any decrease of value caused by theft, loss or unavoidable accident will be suffered by R. Should the brothers be called upon to pay L her ketubah, one quarter of such payment should come out of R's share. R may not claim that her father has made her an outright gift, free of any lien or obligation, since A did not intend to give R a greater share than that of his sons. After L's death, R may exact an oath from her brothers to the effect that they did not retain for themselves anything belonging to her.
Q. L's trustee claimed that L's property which she had given to her husband, had been given only to gratify him, but had not been intended as an outright gift. Therefore, this property had belonged to L; and she gave it to her mother by right.
A. This property was not listed in L's ketubah, and was thus considered niksei melug regarding which a woman may not claim that her gift thereof to her husband was not actually meant to be binding but was given in order to gratify him (B. B. 50a). Therefore, the gift was binding, and she no longer had any claim to said property. She had no right to give it to her mother.
This Resp. is addressed to: "My teacher Rabbi Eliezer b. Ephraim."
SOURCES: Cr. 30; Pr. 243–4; Am II, 18.

Q. A drew up a legal document in which he used the following words: "Effective as of today, but to be executed after our (meaning himself and his wife, L) deaths, our daughter R shall inherit an equal share with her brothers, those already born and those that might be born, in whatever will remain of my estate." After A's death, his children and his widow, L, interpreted the document to mean that A had appointed L trustee over his estate. When L proved a very inefficient, careless, and wasteful trustee, A's sons reached an agreement with L, whereby she was to receive forty marks for turning over the estate to A's sons immediately. Before relinquishing her trusteeship, L and her youngest son B (who was eighteen years of age) agreed to allow R's husband to take his wife's share of the estate immediately, without having to wait for L's death. A's two other sons object to this latter agreement.
A. A's heirs were entitled to take over his estate at any time they wished to do so. The giving of forty marks to L in order that she relinquish her trusteeship, was entirely unnecessary, for A's document, while making the collection of R's share in A's estate dependant on L's death, did not appoint L trustee of said estate. Moreover, had A explicitly appointed L trustee of his estate, the court would have removed her at no expense to the heirs, since she had proven to be inefficient, careless, and wasteful. The second agreement is not binding on A's two sons since L, not being a trustee of the estate, had no legal power to dispose of part of the estate. B, however, was able to forego his own part of R's share, and his act is binding upon such part if R (or her husband) was in possession of her share at the time of the latter agreement. Thus R would be entitled to receive one third of her share (B's part of her share) immediately, while B's two brothers would manage the other two-thirds for their own profit and gain until L's death.
Although the brothers are entitled to manage R's share for their own profit, they are not permitted to sell or otherwise alienate any part of it; and their responsibility thereto would be that of a gratuitous watchman. Thus any increase that will accrue until L's death will belong to the brothers, while, any decrease of value caused by theft, loss or unavoidable accident will be suffered by R. Should the brothers be called upon to pay L her ketubah, one quarter of such payment should come out of R's share. R may not claim that her father has made her an outright gift, free of any lien or obligation, since A did not intend to give R a greater share than that of his sons. After L's death, R may exact an oath from her brothers to the effect that they did not retain for themselves anything belonging to her.
Q. L's trustee claimed that L's property which she had given to her husband, had been given only to gratify him, but had not been intended as an outright gift. Therefore, this property had belonged to L; and she gave it to her mother by right.
A. This property was not listed in L's ketubah, and was thus considered niksei melug regarding which a woman may not claim that her gift thereof to her husband was not actually meant to be binding but was given in order to gratify him (B. B. 50a). Therefore, the gift was binding, and she no longer had any claim to said property. She had no right to give it to her mother.
This Resp. is addressed to: "My teacher Rabbi Eliezer b. Ephraim."
SOURCES: Cr. 30; Pr. 243–4; Am II, 18.

R. Solomon b. Machir discusses the case of a husband who sold, without his wife's consent, property which he had originally contributed to the household, upon marriage. R. Solomon maintains that this property had become mortgaged to the wife's ketubah, and therefore the husband cannot sell it without his wife's consent; neither is it subject to collection by a creditor. The same applies to clothing for daily wear that was given to the wife following the wedding.
However, jewelry and Sabbath clothes which were given to the wife following the wedding, is subject to collection by a creditor, and the husband has the right to sell same, unless it was certain, that the husband intended that it be mortgaged for the ketubah.
R. Hayyim Eliezer is in doubt about R. Solomon's conclusions.

Q. A's widow and son, through their representative, summoned B, A's brother, before us. The representative claimed that A had given wine to B for the purpose of transporting it to Magdeburg and selling it there, and that B bartered this wine for a horse. He demanded, therefore, that B return the horse either to the widow, in payment of her ketubah, or to the orphan who was the rightful heir. B claimed that he had become surety to a Gentile for a loan of five and one quarter marks, contracted by A, that A's wife had vowed to repay this debt and release him from his suretyship; that A had given him the wine for the purpose of selling it and buying his release with that money; that the horse was worth only three marks, and that the widow, therefore, still owed him two and one quarter marks. The representative, however, claimed that A had effected B's release from his suretyship. We decided, temporarily, that B should take an oath to the effect that he has as yet not been released from his suretyship and that he had received the wine for the purpose of buying such release; in which case he should be entitled to retain the horse. However, before B took the prescribed oath, he sold the horse for six pounds, which now had a value of four and one-quarter marks, and he made a settlement with the Gentile (A's creditor for the 5¼ marks) to pay him one mark per year for six years. B wanted to give the six pounds to his mother-in-law for investment purposes, she promising to pay the one mark per year for six years to the Gentile. The representative, however, claimed that B was in possession of an amount equal to the value of the horse only and that B must pay out of his own pocket the difference between this amount and the amount due the Gentile. He demanded that B return the six pounds to the widow and her son, who were willing to provide sureties to the Gentile guaranteeing the payment of one mark per year for six years. B, on the other hand, claimed that he was entitled to benefit from the advantageous settlement he negotiated with A's creditor; that being able to release himself completely from his suretyship by his shrewdness in the use of the four and one-quarter marks, he was entitled to do so; and that he was taking a risk since (the coins comprising) the six pounds were almost certain to be invalidated and be worth less than four and one quarter marks. Moreover, B claimed that A had promised to pay him for his efforts in selling the wine, and that he had guaranteed another debt of A which had not been paid. We shall follow your decision in this matter. Furthermore, please inform us whether or not B may exact an oath from the widow to the effect that she did not vow to release him from his suretyship.
A. B has no claim on the money he received for the horse if his complete release from his suretyship is effected in other ways, especially since he had as yet not taken the required oath. Since the widow and her son are willing to guarantee such a release, B must return that money to them. However, if B take an oath to the effect that A owed him a certain amount of money, either for his effort in selling the wine or for becoming surety for another debt, he will be entitled to retain such an amount. B may exact an oath from the widow (to the effect that she did not vow to pay the above debt of five and one-quarter marks) under the following conditions only: a) If it is an established fact that A did not effect the release of B from his suretyship; b) if B claims that the widow had made the vow mentioned above before he became surety for A. If the former condition is lacking, the widow is not required to take an oath when the claim against her is based on a doubtful premise; and if the latter condition is lacking, the widow never became responsible for that debt. If she made the vow referred to above, she is still under solemn obligation to keep her vow, but is not required to take an oath. However, the representative's claim that B was in possession of an amount equal to the value of the horse only, is baseless.
SOURCES: L. 218, 219; cf. Hag. Maim., Shebuoth 11, 3.

Q. A drew up a legal document in which he used the following words: "Effective as of today, but to be executed after our (meaning himself and his wife, L) deaths, our daughter R shall inherit an equal share with her brothers, those already born and those that might be born, in whatever will remain of my estate." After A's death, his children and his widow, L, interpreted the document to mean that A had appointed L trustee over his estate. When L proved a very inefficient, careless, and wasteful trustee, A's sons reached an agreement with L, whereby she was to receive forty marks for turning over the estate to A's sons immediately. Before relinquishing her trusteeship, L and her youngest son B (who was eighteen years of age) agreed to allow R's husband to take his wife's share of the estate immediately, without having to wait for L's death. A's two other sons object to this latter agreement.
A. A's heirs were entitled to take over his estate at any time they wished to do so. The giving of forty marks to L in order that she relinquish her trusteeship, was entirely unnecessary, for A's document, while making the collection of R's share in A's estate dependant on L's death, did not appoint L trustee of said estate. Moreover, had A explicitly appointed L trustee of his estate, the court would have removed her at no expense to the heirs, since she had proven to be inefficient, careless, and wasteful. The second agreement is not binding on A's two sons since L, not being a trustee of the estate, had no legal power to dispose of part of the estate. B, however, was able to forego his own part of R's share, and his act is binding upon such part if R (or her husband) was in possession of her share at the time of the latter agreement. Thus R would be entitled to receive one third of her share (B's part of her share) immediately, while B's two brothers would manage the other two-thirds for their own profit and gain until L's death.
Although the brothers are entitled to manage R's share for their own profit, they are not permitted to sell or otherwise alienate any part of it; and their responsibility thereto would be that of a gratuitous watchman. Thus any increase that will accrue until L's death will belong to the brothers, while, any decrease of value caused by theft, loss or unavoidable accident will be suffered by R. Should the brothers be called upon to pay L her ketubah, one quarter of such payment should come out of R's share. R may not claim that her father has made her an outright gift, free of any lien or obligation, since A did not intend to give R a greater share than that of his sons. After L's death, R may exact an oath from her brothers to the effect that they did not retain for themselves anything belonging to her.
Q. L's trustee claimed that L's property which she had given to her husband, had been given only to gratify him, but had not been intended as an outright gift. Therefore, this property had belonged to L; and she gave it to her mother by right.
A. This property was not listed in L's ketubah, and was thus considered niksei melug regarding which a woman may not claim that her gift thereof to her husband was not actually meant to be binding but was given in order to gratify him (B. B. 50a). Therefore, the gift was binding, and she no longer had any claim to said property. She had no right to give it to her mother.
This Resp. is addressed to: "My teacher Rabbi Eliezer b. Ephraim."
SOURCES: Cr. 30; Pr. 243–4; Am II, 18.